7 8 Trust can transform conflicting interests into cooperation. But how can 9 individuals know when to trust others? Here, I develop the theory that 10 reputation building may signal cooperative intent, or 'trustworthiness'. I model 11 a simple representation of this theory in which individuals (1) optionally invest 12 in a reputation by performing costly helpful behaviour ('signalling'); (2) 13 optionally use others' reputations when choosing a partner; and (3) optionally 14 cooperate with that partner. In evolutionary simulations, high levels of 15 reputation building; of choosing partners based on reputation; and of 16 cooperation within partnerships emerged. Costly helping behaviour evolved 17 into an honest signal of trustworthiness when it was adaptive for cooperators, 18 relative to defectors, to invest in the long-term benefits of a reputation for 19 helping. I show using game theory that this occurs when cooperators gain 20 larger marginal benefits from investing in signalling than do defectors. This 21 happens without the usual costly signalling assumption that individuals are of 22 two 'types' which differ in quality. Signalling of trustworthiness may help 23 explain phenomena such as philanthropy, pro-sociality, collective action, 24 punishment, and advertising in humans and may be particularly applicable to 25 courtship in other animals. 26 78
Agents were allocated by the computer program to one of two roles: those in the 151 Competitor role competed to be selected to form partnerships with those in the 152 Selector role. Selectors were assumed to be seeking partners to form a mutually 153 beneficial relationship. Ahead of these partnerships, Competitors could pay a cost 154 and thereby develop a 'reputation' in the eyes of a Selector, or they could opt not to 155 pay this cost. Selectors could then decide whether to select those who had paid the 156 cost (signalled) or to accept any partner presented to them by the program. 157 Whenever Selectors accepted a partner, they then played a dyadic iterated social 158 dilemma game in which reciprocity led to mutual benefit (see 'Play' below). Through 159 evolutionary simulation, I investigated the fate of strategies of investing in a 160 cooperative reputation by giving unconditionally versus withholding help; of selecting 161 a partner with a good reputation or of accepting an assigned partner; and for both 162 roles, of cooperating versus defecting in subsequent dyadic interactions. Figure 2 163 summarizes these strategies. The model assumes that individuals differ in their profitability as cooperation partners 178 solely in terms of their strategy. It therefore does not consider type differences due to 179 resources or abilities that form the basis of typical costly signalling models (Gintis et 180 al. 2001) . I further assume that these expressed differences are detectable by 181 potential partners as a signal or reputation index; and that individuals can choose 182 partners for future interactions based on this. Crucially, there is no pre-set link 183 between displaying and continuing to cooperate after being chosen and thus 184 cheating by signalling and then exploiting a partner is possible in the system. Agents in Selector and Competitor roles were assigned strategies by the program.
188
Competitors were given strategies of either investing in a Signal or not (No Signal).
189
Selectors had strategies of either choosing those who had invested in a Signal At the start of each simulation, all Competitor agents were initialized with strategy 206 elements set to "No Signal, Defect", while Selector agents were initialized with "Any,
207
Defect", on the basis that we were interested in whether investing in signalling, and 208 choosing signallers, can become established through association with cooperation in 209 an environment which started with none of these. Agents in the Competitor role were 210 initialized with a reputation index of neutral, reflecting the fact that each agent starts a 211 generation with no interaction history. All agents started with a baseline payoff set to 212 1000 so that no payoffs would be negative and selection would be weak. Competitor. If the Selector had the strategy 'Choose' then it rejected randomly 223 assigned partners until assigned one that did carry the Signal strategy element. Any
224
Competitor that had previously been in partnership with a Selector was rejected. This 225 meant that there was no opportunity for learning and memory from experience about 226 which Competitors were cooperative, and therefore that partner choice could not Competitor randomly assigned by the program. This process resulted in all Selectors 231 having one interaction for each cycle m through the group, while Competitors had an 232 average of one but had a variance depending on the extent of partner choice. Choice 233 was costly in that Choosy agents faced a probability h that they would get no partner.
234
This was implemented as a simple exogenous expected opportunity cost so that 235 choosiness could not drift when signalling was common, but that further assumptions 236 about how the costs of choice might vary were not made. By default, each island 237 metapopulation was cycled through m=50 times, meaning that each agent had a 0.5 238 probability on average of meeting each other agent. Defectors would have the higher payoff, while above this value, Cooperators had a 256 higher payoff. This is the classic game structure and result of (Axelrod and Hamilton 257 1981). It implements the basic conundrum of social dilemmas in that there can be a 258 benefit in selecting cooperative partners for long term relationships, yet a risk that 259 partners will defect and exploit cooperative first plays.
260
Agents had relationships with multiple other agents. In each of m meetings an agent 261 followed the processes described above of competing for / selecting partners and 262 then playing the repeated social dilemma with those partners (see program structure 263 in Figure S1 ). As described in the subsection 'Signalling and partner choice', agents 264 could not be paired with those with which they had already had a relationship.
265
Therefore the model considered choice of partners for long term reciprocally Cooperators were more likely to signal than were defectors: the proportions of 307 cooperators and defectors that signalled were 0.96 ± 0.01 and 0.42 ± 0.02 308 respectively (averaged over 10 simulations, of 100 generations; Figure 4a ). Thus, 309 those agents which went on to cooperate in stage 2 were much more likely to have 310 signalled in stage 1. Looking at this from the perspective of a Selector, the probability 311 that a Signaller was a Cooperator was much higher than the probability that a Non-312 signaller was a Cooperator (0.99 ± 0.00 and 0.65 ± 0.02 respectively; values from 10 313 simulations and 100 generations; Figure 4b) ). We can see from this result that there is a basic asymmetry between cooperation and 347 defection strategies in the payoffs they get from being chosen; and hence that 348 signalling provides information that the Competitor will go on to play Cooperate.
349
Specifically, given these assumptions, signalling and cooperating will be linked when 350 the payoff for signallers of maintaining reputation (in repeated rounds of mutual 351 cooperation) is greater than the short-term payoff from exploiting good reputation.
352
Conversely, it is not strategic for defectors to invest in a reputation (pay costs of the analytical prediction that signalling and choice will be found when signalling is 387 honest, which will be when a low cost of signalling and a high benefit from repeated 388 rounds make the marginal costs of signalling lower for co-operators than for 389 defectors. For example, when the number of plays is high, there are larger gains to 390 be made from cooperative partnerships and so co-operators have more to gain, 391 hence it can be worth signalling that one is a co-operator. Figure S2 ). Increasing the benefit:cost ratio increased the long term 400 benefits of cooperation and so as predicted increased the levels of signalling and 401 choice ( Figure S3 ). Increasing the population size, N, above the default level had 402 little effect on signalling but choice fell away, probably because choice is 403 proportionally less effective when searching through larger populations ( Figure S4 ).
404
Signalling and choice fall away at high numbers of meetings ( Figure S5 ). This is Figure S6 ). The baseline value for payoff used did not impact on 410 behaviour, showing the results are robust to the strength of selection ( Figure S7 ).
411
There was some variability in results at low numbers of islands, but at or above the 412 default value of 10, there was little further quantitative impact of varying population 413 structure in this way ( Figure S8 ). These results illustrate how paying a cost to help others can be strategic for those 419 who go on to form mutually beneficial cooperative interactions and not for those who 420 take the short-term benefit of defection. They show that the differential benefits of co-operators will get a high payoff once, but this is likely to be insufficient to make 480 signalling profitable. By signalling, agents demonstrated that they were investing in a 481 long term relationship; and so it paid those choosing partners to prefer signallers.
482
This model provides theoretical evidence in support of the hypothesis that I had The issue of maintaining reputation versus taking a short term temptation is As we have seen, the reputation-based partner choice model is based on paying an 502 upfront cost. In this it is convergent with the notion of commitment devices (Frank 503 1988). The rationale is that an initial investment commits one to a course of action, in 504 this case benefiting from long term cooperation as opposed to taking the temptation 505 to defect. One can predict that the greater the potential benefits from cooperative interactions (Silk, Kaldor, and Boyd 2000) in that it specifically explains costly 511 reputation-building and in that reputations are the result of single signalling events 512 rather than being learned over many rounds.
514
The work presented here necessarily has limitations in its application. Each signalling 515 system in the real world may have different properties. The model is intended to 516 apply to behavioural signals. Individuals are envisaged to perform some behaviour 517 directed towards observers who may or may not elect to respond to the behaviour.
518
Specific models of real-world systems would need to tailor the model to account for 519 factors such as how many potential partners can be influenced by one signal. Table S1 ). 
